Book Project
The Assurance Dilemma in Coercive International Politics
Successful coercive strategies require not only that I credibly threaten you until you comply, but also that I credibly assure you that I will not punish you after you comply. This is the overlooked dilemma at the heart of coercion. In my book project, I show that threats often fail because they are insufficiently contingent in the eyes of targets.
I examine cases of coercive bargaining over nuclear weapons programs, especially South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran. I rely on primary documents from the U.S. government, the South African apartheid-era government, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I supplement my archival research with the memoirs, recollections, and writings of policymakers, military leaders, and nuclear scientists. I also conduct interviews with participants.