Book
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The Art of Coercion presents a fresh explanation for the success—and failure—of coercive demands in international politics.
Strong states are surprisingly bad at coercion. History shows they prevail only a third of the time. Pauly argues that coercion often fails because targets fear punishment even if they comply. In this "damned if you do, damned if you don't" scenario, targets have little reason to obey.
Pauly illustrates this logic in nuclear counterproliferation efforts with South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran. He shows that coercers face an "assurance dilemma": When threats are more credible, assurances not to punish are less so. But without credible assurances, targets may defy threats, bracing for seemingly inevitable punishment. For coercion to work, as such, coercers must not only make targets believe that they will be punished if they do not comply, but also that they will not be if they do.
Packed with insights for any foreign policy challenge involving coercive strategies, The Art of Coercion crucially corrects assumptions that tougher threats alone achieve results.
Praise for The Art of Coercion:
A major contribution to deterrence and coercion theory. Pauly's rich case studies take us inside adversaries' minds to understand how they saw the world, not just how US leaders saw them. — Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University
Deeply researched and insightful. Using new sources and interviews to demonstrate the power of his theory, Pauly significantly contributes to the literature on, and the real-world practice of, coercion. — Charles L. Glaser, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This book could not have come at a more important time. We have all thought too little about how successful coercion happens, and Pauly critically explores overlooked assurance elements. — Kori Schake, American Enterprise Institute
An article based on the book was published in International Security.